Abstract: Aboriginal rights were recognized and affirmed in the Constitution Act, 1982, and subsequent jurisprudence has served to provide some sense as to their nature and contours. There have been, however, only a few serious attempts to provide any sort of theoretical framework through which such rights might be more fully understood. As 'rights' they might be made understandable through any number of possible rights-frameworks (particularly those that make sense of either collective interests or a collective will), though as 'Aboriginal' they must answer to a particular complex history and larger social and political context. These frameworks may not be, however, satisfactory, as from the perspective of the purported rights-holders these elements of Canadian law can seem like quite odd creatures. Aboriginal rights-holders are told their rights are rooted in a past predating the Crown and yet only exist as instruments fully within the Canadian system. More troubling, these rights are held out as progressive tools purposefully directed toward a vaunted reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies and yet they have been defined in such a way (by non-Aboriginal Canadian courts) as to be highly restricted in both nature and application. One might suspect that Aboriginal rights are not at all as they seem, that critical theories suspicious of the rhetoric, theories eager to dig below superficial articulations and pronouncements to explore possibilities around relationships between power, knowledge, and meaning, might be more fruitful sources of insight than theories about rights per se. This paper investigates a certain kind of critical approach, one that places weight on particular understandings of the notions of interpretation and perspective. The question is about the fruitfulness of this approach.